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The Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations
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by
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T

he Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,1 issued by the
United States Department of the Navy in July 1987, is a model of clarity
and conciseness. Given the audience for which it was intended, it is
resoundingly successful in explaining the intricacies of the law. Its clear and
authoritative style, however, sometimes conceals the controversial nature of
some of the statements which it includes. It is the purpose of this paper to
review the Handbook, discussing the more controversial pronouncements and
setting it against the background of the contemporary, and sometimes
unsettled, Law of the Sea. The comments made are in no sense intended as
a criticism of the drafting of the Handbook as an exposition of the United States'
view of international law, which could scarcely be bettered. They merely
point out some of the difficulties which attend that view of the law, which
for the most part could not reasonably be canvassed in the Handbook itself.
The comments are not an exhaustive catalogue of the cases where the
legislation or views of third States or commentators differ from that of the
United States, but they are illustrative of the kinds of questions which might
arise from strict adherence to the account given in the Handbook.
The Handbook is divided into two parts, The Law of Peacetime Naval
Operations and the Law of Naval Warfare, which will be discussed in turn.
First, however, it is necessary to deal with certain general issues raised in
the Preface to the Handbook.
The Handbook claims disarmingly to set forth "general guidance," and not
to be "a comprehensive treatment of the law" or "a substitute for the
definitive legal guidance provided by judge advocates and others responsible
for advising commanders on the law."2 However, while there are certainly
detailed points of interpretation upon which the Handbook is not to be taken
as a definitive guide, it is plain that the Handbook is intended to represent
United States Navy thinking on the broad lines of international law, and hence
to some extent will operate as a constraint upon those who give more detailed
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advice. For instance, the Preface lists only two sources of international law:
custom and treaties. There is no suggestion of recourse to resolutions of
international organizations for the determination of what international law
might be. This is unfortunate since, quite apart from the crucial importance
of such resolutions in the particular context of the legality of operations on
the deep sea-bed, resolutions adopted by bodies such as the International Civil
Aviation Organization are of great significance in the adumbration of the
law concerning other maritime zones of more immediate concern to naval
commanders.
Moreover, the definition of customary international law given in the
Preface, though according closely with classical formulations which treat
customary law as a homogeneous body of law applicable to all States, gives
no sense of the decisive importance of persistent objection and acquiescence
in State practice, which can, respectively, except States from the binding
force of emergent norms of customary international law or bind them to
acceptance of norms which command less than general acceptance in State
practice.3 Given that the United States persistently objected to territorial sea
claims in excess of three miles until its conditional acceptance of wider claims
in 1983 or SO,4 and that some of the statements in the Handbook amount to
novel interpretations of the law of the sea, persistent objection and
acquiescence remain important considerations in the accurate determination
of the rules of international law applicable in any concrete dispute.

The Law of Peacetime Naval Operations
1. Legal Divisions of the Oceans and Airspace. The first chapter in this part
of the Handbook deals with the legal divisions of the oceans and airspace, and
it begins with a summary of the law concerning baselines. Two points call
for comment. First, while acknowledging the propriety of straight baselines
drawn along coastlines where it is impracticable to utilize the low-water
mark, as where the coastline is deeply indented or fringed by islands,S the
Handbook notes that "the United States, with few exceptions, does not employ
this practice and interprets restrictively its use by others."6 It is true that
the restrictions on the use of straight baselines set out in the 1958 Territorial
Sea Convention were recently reaffirmed in the 1982 Convention, and there
was no significant support at UNCLOS III for any substantial relaxation of
those restrictions. On the other hand, State practice is clearly moving towards
a liberal interpretation of the circumstances in which straight baselines can
be used. A recent study7 sets out straight baseline claims made by 46 States,
including many (such as those made by Algeria, Burma, Colombia, Cuba,
Ecuador, France, Guinea, Iran, Italy, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco,
Mozambique, Senegal, Spain and Vietnam) which are by no means easy to
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reconcile with the conventional and customary law criteria for the use of
such baselines.
It is understood that the United States has protested against some of these
claims, reserving its legal rights. There is a risk of the United States being
held to have acquiesced in the validity of other claims, although since the
acquiescence only arises from silence in circumstances which demand a protest
because they affect the actual (as opposed to the abstract) interests of a State,
this possibility is theoretical rather than real. However, there is a more
insidious danger. If the pattern of liberal use of baselines persists and spreads,
a view might emerge that it represents either an agreed interpretation of the
conventional rules or a development in the customary law, in either case
allowing such claims. This gives rise to complex questions of treaty law
concerning the ability of what may ultimately be a minority (perhaps a small
minority) of parties to hold out against an interpretation of a multilateral
treaty adopted by the other parties. This problem is compounded by the
difficult question whether the boundaries of a State, determined inter alia by
its baseline, can differ vis-a-vis different States. While it would probably
overstate the case to say that the United States is in danger of having its legal
rights eroded by this development in State practice, there is at least a cause
for concern here which should be recognized.
The second point concerns claims to historic bays, such as the Libyan claim
to the Gulf of Sirte which has occasioned difficulties in the past. 8 The Handbook
states that "[t]he United States has taken the position that an actual showing
of acquiescence by foreign nations in such a claim is required, as opposed
to a mere absence of opposition,"9 if the historic claim is to be valid. This
is controversial for two reasons. First, it might be said that it is not the
acquiescence of foreign nations, but only of the United States, which need
be shown: if the United States had acquiesced in the claim, it would be bound
to accept its validity, whether or not other States had acquiesced in it.
Acquiescence by the United States is, however, unlikely. In the Gulf ofSirte,
for instance, the United States put beyond doubt its rejection of the Libyan
claims by asserting its freedom to use the disputed waters as high seas.
Secondly, the requirement of acquiescence, as opposed to the mere absence
of protest, is itself less clearly settled than the Handbook might imply. The
International Court in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case suggested that the
general toleration of a notorious claim-the mere absence of protest-is
enough to render the claim valid, and controversy over the matter is alive
in academic circles.lO This point might also be argued in relation to straight
baseline systems, which are simply a means of defining those waters which
could become internal waters of a State by way of historic title even if the
original drawing of the baseline was unlawful. Here again is a possibility that
the Handbook points to in the rejection of certain maritime claims which might
be held by an international tribunal to be opposable to the United States.
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The Handbook turns next to the definition of the various maritime zones
which might be claimed by States. Although these definitions are not of
central importance, the rights and duties of States within the zones being dealt
with in more detail elsewhere in the Handbook, it is worth noting that some
of the definitions are questionable. Paragraph 1.5 of the Handbook is headed
"International Waters," and covers the contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), high seas and security zones. The contiguous zone is stated, with
an impeccable adherence to the wording of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions ,11
to be the zone within which a State may prevent and punish infringements
of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and regulations that occur
within its territory or territorial sea. That definition is, however, arguably
too restrictive. Many State claims to contiguous zones assert the right to
punish not only infringements committed within the territory or territorial
sea of the State, but also infringements committed within the contiguous zone
itself; in short, they claim both jurisdiction to enforce and jurisdiction to
prescribe in the contiguous zone. However, the terms of the conventional
definition adopted in the Handbook, whether construed literally or in the light
of the travaux preparatoires of article 24 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention,
grant only jurisdiction to enforce in the contiguous zone. 12 Moreover, the
list of interests which may be protected in the contiguous zone, which is
limited to customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters, sits awkwardly
with United States judicial practice. In cases such as the Tairo Maru 13 and
Gonzalez,14 United States courts have taken a liberal view of the rights of
coastal States to exercise jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea in what may
loosely be termed as the contiguous zone, extending in terms of subject matter
beyond the limits laid down in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions. It has, however,
to be said that the more conservative line taken in the Handbook accords with
that taken by the Geographer of the United States Department of State. 1S
In particular, the refusal of the Handbook to admit the validity of contiguous
zones for security purposes16 is consistent with the views of the Geographer. 17
Perhaps the most significant divergence from the wording of the
international conventions in this section of the Handbook concerns the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). While the description of these 200-mile
zones as "resource-related zones" might be regarded as a reasonable
simplification of their nature, the description of the rights of third States in
the zone is more controversial. It is stated that "in the EEZ all nations enjoy
the right to exercise the traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight, of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and of all other
traditional high seas uses by ships which are not resource related. "18 That
is not what the 1982 Convention says. Article 58 of the Convention expressly
ascribes to third States in the EEZ only
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[T]he freedoms referred to in article 87 [on the freedoms of the high seas] of navigation
and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the seas related to these freedoms, such as those associated
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible
with the other provisions of this Convention.

The controversy centers upon the legality of activities such as weapons testing
and naval exercises, and the laying of submarine monitoring systems (such
as the SOSUS chains) in the EEZ, without the permission of the coastal State.
One view, advanced in the Handbook, is that all such traditional high seas
activities fall within the concept of "other internationally lawful uses of the
seas related to" the freedom of navigation and pipe- and cable-laying set out
in article 58, and that they are therefore lawful if committed in the EEZ of
a third State, even if the State objects to such activities.1 9 That view is not
shared by all States. For example, Brazil, Cape Verde and Uruguay have
asserted that various military activities, such as exercises involving the use
of weapons, may not be conducted within the EEZ without coastal State
consent.20 States taking this position might argue that weapons testing and
the deployment of underwater monitoring systems are neither expressly listed
in article 58 as specific "high seas" freedoms preserved in the EEZ nor
included within the category of "other internationally lawful uses of the seas
related to" the specified freedoms. Naval exercises in an area of EEZ
involving the use of guns, bombs and rockets, for example, might be said
to be essentially different from and unrelated to the freedom of navigation,
as may the sowing of unarmed mines. 21 The laying of SOSUS chains which
monitor shipping movements in the area might equally be said to be distinct
from normal pipe- and cable-laying activities, where the pipes and cables are
used for transportation across the zone in question rather than for the
collection of intelligence from it. Furthermore the exclusive right, of the
coastal state, under article 60 of the 1982 Convention, to authorize and
construct installations and structures in the EEZ which may interfere with
the exercise of its rights in the zone offers an alternative basis for coastal
interference. It might be said, for instance, that a SOSUS chain which
stretches across the EEZ of a State so as to make it impossible for coastal
State naval vessels to put to sea without detection by a third State interferes
with the right of the coastal State to police and defend the waters adjacent
to its coast. Finally, the coastal State might claim that any of the foregoing
arguments are sufficient to create a doubt as to the respective scope of coastal
and third State rights, and that a proper interpretation of article 59 (not 58)
of the 1982 Convention resolves that issue "on the basis of equity and in the
light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective
importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the
international community as a whole."
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The merits of these opposing arguments have been canvassed elsewhere,22
and that task will not be repeated here. It should be clearly stated, however,
that the views ascribed to Cape Verde have been expressed only by a tiny
minority of States, and have been plainly rejected by rather more States
(including the United States in the statement made at the signing of the Final
Act of UNCLOS III)23 and also by the overwhelming majority of
commentators. It is, of course, entirely proper that the Handbook should refrain
from raising what might reasonably be considered to be specious C?bjections
to the United States' view. However, it is equally proper that arguments
which may yet be deployed against the United States should be noted in a
commentary on the Handbook. If these disagreements over the interpretation
of the 1982 Convention were to be resolved, that would do no more than
clear the way for the even more difficult question of the extent to which
the details of the Convention's provisions on the EEZ and other matters (and
in particular article 59) have entered into customary law. The only point being
made here is that the question of third-State rights in the EEZ is not quite
as cut and dried as might appear from the Handbook.
Briefly, the Handbook adopts the definition of the continental shelf set out
in the 1982 Convention, according to which coastal State rights over the shelf
extend, broadly speaking, to the limits of the geological continental margin
or to 200 miles from the baseline, whichever is farther. 24 The provision is
significant for many States, notably in the Pacific Ocean, whose geological
shelves are much narrower than 200 miles. Some might question whether
contemporary customary law does yet follow the 1982 Convention in
automatically ascribing the seabed out to 200 miles to the coastal State, where
the continental margin does not extend out to that distance, and where the
coastal State has not claimed seabed rights out to 200 miles. However, the
Handbook, if it departs at all from customary law, concedes rights which the
U.S. might otherwise have reserved and is therefore unlikely to generate
international friction.
The final, minor, point on the definitions set out in chapter 1 of the Handbook
concerns the assertion that in the absence of treaty constraints there is a
freedom to use "international airspace (that over contiguous zones, exclusive
economic zones, the high seas, and territory not subject to the sovereignty
of any nation). "25 It may be noted that this view has been challenged by some
States. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are reported to have suggested that
coastal States have the right to regulate by national legislation all aeronautical
activities in their EEZ'S.26 However, the drafting history of the 1982
Convention clearly supports the United States' view, and this is supported
by a recent report to the International Civil Aviation Organization which
concludes that there is no basis for the assertion that the 1982 Convention
gives coastal States jurisdiction over overflight in the EEZ.27 While this
conclusion is certainly right, the attitude of Brazil and others, mirroring
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similar arguments concerning military uses of the EEZ, outlined above, should
be seen as signalling that free overflight of the EEZ might not always and
in all circumstances be regarded in practice as unquestionable by all states
despite the true position in law.28

2. International Status and Navigation of Warships and Military Aircraft. The
second chapter of the Handbook raises more acute issues oflaw touching upon
naval operations. The definition of warships and military aircraft and the
account of their immunities follows the terms of the 1958 and 1982 conventions
on the Law of the Sea and is in general uncontroversial, although it should
be noted that naval auxiliaries, while enjoying the same immunities as
warships, are not within the definition of warships given in the Handbook or
the conventions.29 One aspect of the definition is, however, controversial. The
Handbook adopts the view taken by the major maritime States that "[n ]uclear
powered warships and conventionally powered warships enjoy identical
international legal status."3O That view is contested by some States. For
instance, Djibouti is reported to require no advance notification or permission
for the passage of warships through its territorial sea, but does require advance
notification for the passage of nuclear-powered ships, and Egypt requires
prior permission for the passage of nuclear-powered, but only prior notice
of the passage of conventional, warships.31 Furthermore, States are of course
entitled in exercising discretions allowed to them by international law to draw
a distinction between those warships which are powered by or carry nuclear
materials and those which do not. Perhaps the clearest example of such a
discretion concerns the admission of warships to ports and internal waters.
As the Handbook notes, in the absence of some treaty arrangement to the
contrary, warships and auxiliaries have no right of entry to the ports or
internal waters of a foreign state.32 The Treaty of Raratonga, which
implemented an agreed move by certain Pacific States towards the
establishment of a nuclear-free zone in a large area of the southern Pacific
around and to the east of Australia, provides in article 5.2 (headed "Prevention
of stationing of nuclear devices") that:
Each party in the exercise ofits sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether
to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace
by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic
waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane
passage or transit passage of straits.33

As discussions in recent years between the governments of New Zealand and
the United States have shown, there is considerable pot~ntial for lawful
discrimination by coastal States against warships carrying nuclear materials,
at least in relation to the entry by such ships into ports and other internal
waters. 34 While special provision may be made to regulate their passage,35
discrimination against ships carrying nuclear materials amounting to a denial
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of passage through straits and archipelagic sea lanes does not appear to be
lawful, nor does such discrimination in relation to rights of innocent passage
simpliciter, although the scope of the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea has been clouded by the drafting of the 1982 Convention.
Article 19 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which defines innocent
passage, is one of the most problematic provisions of that Convention from
the point of view of naval operations, although most of the problems operate
at the level of legalistic arguments against the robust good sense of the
Handbook. Article 19 opens, in its first paragraph, with the definition used
in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention: "Passage is innocent so long as it is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such
passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other
rules of intemationallaw."36 The second paragraph then states that:
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security
of the coastal State;

(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;

(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;

U) the carrying out of research or survey activities;

(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage.

The problems of interpretation are manifold. The question whether the
list of activities incompatible with innocence in article 19(2) is illustrative
or exhaustive is clearly answered in the Handbook, which is surely correct
in regarding the list as merely illustrative. 37 No answer is given to the further
question, whether the ejusdem generis principle applies to the construction of
article 19, requiring that there be some activity on a par with those listed in
article 19(2) before innocence be lost. If that construction is correct, it would
follow that the mere fact of the presence of a passing warship, not engaged
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in any "activity" of the sort listed in article 19(2), could not be the basis for
a finding that its passage is non-innocent. Similarly, a law stating that the
mere carriage on a merchant ship through the territorial sea of "cargo or
any appliance or apparatus the use of which or persons who may constitute
a threat against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of the Republic, shall be deemed to be not innocent . . . " could not be
lawfu1.38 Under the 1958 definition, which now constitutes article 19(1) of
the 1982 Convention, a coastal State could argue persuasively in some
circumstances that the very presence of a warship or carriage of such cargo
prejudiced its peace, good order or security. For instance, the mere passage
of a superpower naval squadron close to the shore during hours of darkness
at a time of substantial civil unrest or insurrection might well be perceived
by a government having a precarious hold on power, but nonetheless
recognized internationally as competent to act on behalf of the State, as
prejudicing the peace and good order of the State; the government might
accordingly determine that such passage is non-innocent. 39 That government
might, furthermore, take the plausible view that the right of a coastal State
to take "the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which
is not innocent"40 means that it is entitled to use the lowest effective level
of force available to it at the time to prevent passage, and it is conceivable
that there might be nothing available between the extremes of a radio message
and a Silkworm missile. If such a situation were to arise, and the commander
of the naval force were to rely on a different interpretation of article 19,
requiring that his warships engage in some "activity" additional to mere
passage before they lose their innocence, this doctrinal dispute could quickly
develop into an international incident.
That does not exhaust the difficulties of interpreting article 19. Among
the other difficulties which have been noted by commentators are the
problems of article 19(2)(a): would the passage of a naval force threatening
the use offorce against a third State be a "threat ... offorce ... in violation
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations," and would the passage of a naval force intended to assist a
government put down an insurrection which is regarded in the United Nations
as an attempt by the people of the country concerned to wrest the right of
self-determination from an unwilling government fall within that provision,
in either case resulting in the loss of innocence and possible political pressure
on coastal States to attempt to prevent the passage? At what point, for
instance, do monitoring coastal installations and broadcasts, soundings on the
seabed or the testing of the salinity or temperature of the water amount to
the collection of information to the prejudice of the defense or security of
the coastal State, or to research or survey activities, proscribed by paragraphs
(c) and U)? Is the towing of a military device such as a towed sonar array,
put overboard before entry into the territorial sea and taken aboard after
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leaving the territorial sea, caught by paragraph {f)? And what "activities"
are comprehended by paragraph (I)?: the movement of missiles onto launchers,
or shadowing foreign submarines, or monitoring the seabed for military
devices which might be emplaced there? Do proscribed activities
automatically deprive passage of its innocence, even if there is no actual
prejudice to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State?
Here, as elsewhere in this paper, the response may be given that there was
a clear understanding at UNCLOS III as to the interpretation which is to
be given to the terms of the 1982 Convention. This is a perfectly adequate
justification for the approach taken in the Handbook, which was not drafted
as a watertight legal document but as an operational guide. But this is not
an entirely adequate response to the problem of coping in practice with the
complex underlying legal questions which might be raised by States
determined to hold to interpretations of the law diverging from those held
by the United States.
Many of the provisions of the 1982 Convention, among them article 19,
are finding their way into nationallegislation. 41 There is a real possibility
that the interpretation of such national laws by national agencies, inevitably
colored by the canons of interpretation applied in the relevant legal systems,
may diverge from the interpretation of the 1982 Convention. Moreover,
political considerations may induce States to interpret the words of the
Convention itself in a manner different from that contemplated during the
conference which spawned it-and if the world has learned anything from
the" U.S. legal system and its most skillful practitioners, it has surely learned
that an agreemep.t may be used ruthlessly against parties who neglect to ensure
that the agreement actually says what they wanted it to say, and says no more.
Most important, the underlying argument throughout this contribution to the
debate is that States do differ in their interpretations of the law, and
consequently the law is not always so clear and precise as to produce certainty,
either concerning the rights and duties of the United States Navy or the likely
attitudes and reactions of other States to the use of their waters by United
States forces. This lack of certainty demands a certain circumspection in the
exercise of the more controversial rights. It was, after all, the vigorous
assertion by Libya of a claim to historic waters in the Gulf of Sirte, which
most States would have regarded as wholly without legal merit, which
produced fatal armed clashes with United States forces.
There are two further points concerning innocent passage to be made. The
first concerns the statement in the Handbook that innocent passage may be
temporarily suspended in specified areas of the territorial sea when this is
essential for the protection of the security of the coastal State.42 That
statement is consistent with the provisions of the conventions,43 and with the
position taken by the United States in protesting against attempts by Libya
to close certain areas of its territorial sea permanently.44 It sits less happily
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with State practice, which contains several examples of laws which have
purported permanently to forbid navigation in specified areas adjacent to
military dockyards and installations. 45 In practice, such claims do not appear
to have given rise to international incidents; pragmatism and prudence may
have prevailed over principle.
It may seem strange to leave until last the fundamental question, whether
warships enjoy the right of innocent passage at all. The well-known
controversy over this question has been debated at length over the years since
Elihu Root, sometime Secretary of State of the United States, addressed to
the arbitral tribunal in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case his much-quoted
(and subsequently, no doubt, much regretted) remark concerning the
territorial sea: "Warships may not pass without consent into this zone, because
they threaten. Merchant ships may pass and repass because they do not
threaten. "46 In essence, his argument was that because warships are inherently
threatening to the coastal State they are inherently non-innocent and outside
the scope of the right of innocent passage. Many States adopt. a similar
position. Nine or so require prior notification as a condition of passage, and
a further twenty-eight or so require prior authorization, the States concerned
being drawn from all the major power blocs and regions.47 This position is
not, however, the one taken by major maritime States such as the United
States and the United Kingdom, both of which assert a right of innocent
passage for warships without prior notification or authorization. Nonetheless,
few international incidents have occurred, largely because of the practice of
giving low-level and informal notice of passage on the occasions when naval
vessels are sent into the territorial seas of States requiring notification or
authorization, which may be followed by a purported "authorization" not
sought by the passing ships: such ambiguous procedures save honor on both
sides. 48 Important as the controversy is as an academic matter, in practice
the world has lived more or less happily with the contradictory interpretations
of the law now for many years, and the assertion of the right of innocent
passage for warships in the Handboo/e49 is unlikely to upset this modus vivendi.
One of the most critical elements in the package deal worked out at
UNCLOS III was the safeguarding of rights of passage through strategic
straits and archipelagic sea lanes in return for the acceptance of extended
coastal State territorial seas and jurisdiction over the economic resources of
the seas off their coasts. The parts of the Handbook dealing with rights to transit
such waters are therefore of particular importance.
The 1982 Convention itself establishes a right of transit passage through
international straits and a substantially identical right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage through archipelagic sea lanes, which are much broader than the rights
of innocent passage enjoyed in the territorial sea. 50 Transit passage and
archipelagic sea lanes passage do not depend upon a showing of "innocence;"
they include a right of overflight, which does not exist over the territorial
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sea; they appear to allow submerged passage by submarines, which is
forbidden in the case of innocent passage; and they impose strict limitations
upon the regulatory competence of the coastal State over ships exercising
the rights of passage. Here the status of the 1982 Convention is of critical
importance. Iran, for example, has stated that the right of transit passage is
"contractual," existing only for parties to the 1982 Convention, and
presumably only once the Convention enters into force. 51
There is little support evident for the Iranian position, and much that can
be said against it. It is not the view taken in the Handbook or by the major
maritime States. Thus, when the United Kingdom extended its territorial sea
to twelve miles in 1987, it announced, albeit without using the term "transit
passage," that rights equivalent to those established under the conventional
transit passage regime would be accorded to ships sailing through the Straits
of Dover and certain other straits around the United Kingdom. 52 Moreover,
it is arguable that rights wider than the right of innocent passage existed
through international straits under customary international law even before
the adoption of the 1982 Convention. In support of this view it has been said
that transit through and overflight of certain key straits such as Gibraltar
has long been conducted in a manner which, like transit passage itself, is more
akin to high seas freedom of navigation than to innocent passage. Furthermore,
it might be said, this earlier practice offers an explanation for the rapid
acceptance of the transit passage provisions into the Law of the Sea
Convention and, perhaps more significantly, for the inclusion in the 1979
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel of a right of "unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight" for all States through the
Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba. 53
Against this view it must be said that the evidence on passage through straits
is by no means always clear. For instance, in the case of the Straits of Gibraltar,
until the 1980s the United States recognized only a three mile territorial sea
and accordingly acted on the basis that there was a high seas corridor through
the strait-an assumption which, if correct, would render the exercise of
freedoms of navigation and overflight through the strait uncontroversial, and
preclude the counting of that practice towards the establishment of a right
to exercise such freedoms through straits constituted entirely by the territorial
seas of the littoral States. It should also be noted that several littoral States
have stated that they do not recognize the right of transit passage in customary
international law. The 1971 Declaration made by Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore is but one among many examples.54
Moreover, there are certain technical problems with the view favoring the
wider right. It is difficult to see how States such as the United States and
United Kingdom, parties to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention which, in
article 16(4), gives merely a non-suspendable right of innocent passage
through international straits, can claim wider rights as against other parties,

Lowe

121

such as Malaysia and Spain, which border international straits. This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention contains
no provision for its termination or denunciation, and the United Kingdom
has recorded the view (in relation to a purported denunciation by Senegal
of, among others, the Territorial Sea Convention) that denunciation is not
possible. 55 There is, therefore, some difficulty in explaining how the parties
to the Territorial Sea Convention can escape the restrictive rights of passage
through straits which that Convention sets out.
It might be argued that only where a treaty intends to exclude wider
customary law rights can the latter be curtailed by a restrictive treaty
provision, and that this is not the case in relation to the law on passage through
straits. But the difficulty of adducing unequivocal evidence to sustain claims
to a customary law right analogous to transit passage or freedom of navigation
through international straits which pre-dates the transit passage provisions
of the 1982 Convention must cast serious doubts upon the legal validity of
such claims. The better course is to argue that the transit passage provisions
have passed into customary law since their elaboration at UNCLOS III so
as to modify the pre-existent treaty rights under the 1958 Convention, and
to seek to establish that position on the basis of State practice, including the
assertion of such rights by the United States Navy, among others.
The most plausible explanation of this process might lie in the doctrine
of desuetude, or disuse. It is said that for desuetude to operate, four
requirements must be satisfied: 1) frequently repeated violations of the treaty,
2) which are imputable to a government and not merely to individuals, and
3) which have no reasonable explanation (other than as a violation of the
treaty), and 4) which have not been negated by the protests of the injured
party.56 It is not clear, however, that the body of action and acquiescence
is yet sufficiently persuasive to justify the conclusion that the provisions of
the 1958 Convention have been swept away. It may be unwise to seek to force
modifications of treaty rights which States appear willing to accept within
any doctrinal straitjacket. The United Kingdom at 'one stage rejected the
validity of archipelagic baselines claimed by Indonesia, another party to the
Territorial Sea Convention, but it would now accept the validity of such
baselines drawn in conformity with the provisions of the 1982 Convention.
This position should perhaps best be seen as illustrating either the proposition
that treaty obligations can be modified, with the agreement of the parties,
by subsequent changes in customary law, or the proposition that States can
choose to waive violations of their treaty rights. Whether this should be
described as an application of the doctrine of desuetude, or as a consensual
modification of treaty rights, or as some other form of development in the
law, is less important than the fact of the change. If rights of transit passage
are asserted often enough, and are not seriously challenged, such rights will
become established in law.
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If the claim is accepted that customary law includes a right similar to the
conventional right of transit passage, further problems concerning transit
passage remain. The Handbook states that the right of transit passage obtains
in "straits used for international navigation through the territorial sea
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. "57 There is nothing wrong
with that statement, which follows the wording of article 37 of the 1982
Convention. The problem lies in determining what it means in practice, and
the Handbook offers no guidance. Differences have arisen between the United
States and other States over whether a particular strait falls within the
category of "straits used for international navigation." For example, the
United States has argued that the Northwest Passage through the Canadian
archipelago is an international strait, but Canada has contested this, arguing
that the waters in question are historic internal waters through which passage
is subject to Canadian control and regulation. It might also be argued that
the volume of traffic through the strait is so small as to disqualify it from
the category of straits used for international navigation. 58 In such cases the
account of transit passage given in the Handbook is of limited value: the critical
factor is the political decision on the vigor with which the United States
wishes to press its view and assert the rights which it claims in relation to
such disputed straits.
Despite the admirable clarity of the definition of transit passage in the 1982
Convention, there are difficulties in determining its precise scope, highlighted
by the manner in which the relevant rules are presented in the Handbook. The
assertion that submarines may transit submerged59 is commonly accepted,
although this right is not spelled out in the 1982 Convention. It is an inference,
albeit a reasonable one, from article 39(1)(c) of the 1982 Convention, which
requires passing vessels to refrain from activities other than those incident
to their "normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit" which, it is
said, can only mean that submarines may transit submerged. More
troublesome is the statement that warships may engage in "formation
steaming and the launching and recovery of aircraft."6O Formation steaming
might be acceptable as a normal precaution for the security of the vessels
concerned, but the 1982 Convention is silent on the question of launching
and recovering aircraft. The right of overflight alone does not seem sufficient
warrant for such activities, which are markedly different in nature from
overflight between points lying outside the territorial sea of the littoral States,
and the justification must be found in the nature of the right of transit passage
itself. Whatever understandings may have been reached at UNCLOS III, these
aircraft rights are not included in the Convention's actual provisions, and their
validity will tum largely upon their unopposed exercise in practice,
constituting an "agreed interpretation" of the Convention for the parties and
a rule of customary law for non-parties.

Lowe

123

It should also be noted that there is some doubt as to whether it is true
in all circumstances that transit passage may not be suspended for ships
engaged in armed conflict with a third State. 61 It is certainly true that the
right of transit passage does not depend upon any criterion of innocence.
However, it is stated, in article 38(3) of the 1982 Convention, that "[a]ny
activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a
strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention."
This raises the question, what "activities" put a vessel outside the scope of
transit passage? At one extreme, it might be argued that any activity other
than continuous and expeditious transit of the strait would have this effect.
On the other hand, the duty of vessels engaged in transit to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the littoral States is not included as an element
of the definition of the right of transit passage in article 38, but as an ancillary
duty in article 39 of the 1982 Convention, thus suggesting that there are
activities other than mere transit which, though unlawful, do not deprive the
passage of its transit character. Here again, the correct interpretation of the
law will have to be constituted by State practice.
Undoubtedly, the major naval powers will choose to see transit passage
as a right close to the high seas freedom of navigation, and will tend to argue
that whatever a vessel in transit through the strait might do while it is in
transit the right of passage cannot be denied, and any complaint of unlawful
behavior must be pursued through the normal channels for settling
international disputes. Of course, a vessel not engaged in transit but, say,
deliberately stationed at anchor in the strait (the anchoring not being
incidental to its passage) would fall outside the right of transit passage; and
because it would by definition be in the territorial sea it would fall under
the rules applicable to that zone, including the rules allowing the coastal State
to use reasonable force to prevent non-innocent passage.
The foregoing remarks on transit passage apply equally to the provisions
in the Handbook concerning the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. 62 A
further problem arises from the position taken by the Philippines, which stated
on signature of the 1982 Convention that
The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify
or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes
and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty,
independence, and security.
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under
the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with
the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for
international navigation. 63

One of the main aims of the provisions on archipelagic sea lanes passage was,
of course, to "impair" the sovereignty of the littoral State, in the sense of
limiting the right of the State to impose its laws on or restrict the movements
of passing ships, and to give such ships transit rights through the major
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established international seaways crossing the archipelago substantially
identical to transit passage rights; and there is no doubt that this is precisely
what the 1982 Convention does. The Philippine position appears absurd, but
it is not entirely devoid of a certain superficial plausibility. It is true that
the 1982 Convention does not detract from the rights of any State to act in
self-defense under the provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
and there is no obvious reason why an archipelagic State party to the 1982
Convention should not enact legislation to that effect, so long as it does not
attempt .to regulate passage through the sea lanes in a manner inconsistent
with the 1982 Convention provisions. That said, it is difficult to believe that
the Philippine statement was seeking merely to establish this banal
proposition. It is also true that in the section of the 1982 Convention dealing
with straits, the transit passage provisions do not extend to straits connecting
the high seas or EEZ with the territorial or internal waters of a State.
Furthermore, the transit passage regime, stricto sensu, does not apply to passages
through archipelagic waters, although the provisions on archipelagic sea lanes
_passage, which are very similar to the transit passage provisions, do so apply.
But again, it is hard to believe that these rather inconsequential points
motivated the Philippine statement. It is scarcely surprising that several
governments have registered forceful objections to the Philippine statement,
characterizing it as an attempt to evade the obligation to accord rights of
archipelagic sea lanes passage to foreign ships and aircraft. 64 If nothing else,
the declaration offers a fine illustration of the danger of States adopting
tortured interpretations of the 1982 Convention whenever it might suit them
to do so.
Apart from the question of Flight Information Regions and Air Defense
Identification Zones, which fall outside the scope of this paper but which
have led to serious controversy in the past,65 there are three further matters
in the second chapter of the Handbook which call for comment and which
are not dealt with elsewhere in this paper: they are the establishment of closed
areas of the high seas, and certain particular problems -arising in the Arctic
and Antarctic. The high seas point can be dealt with swiftly. The Handbook
states that
Any nation may declare a temporary closure or warning area on the high seas to advise
other nations of the conduct of activities that, although lawful, are hazardous to
navigation and/or overflight.... Ships and aircraft of other nations are not required
to remain outside a declared closure or warning area, but are obliged to refrain from
interfering with activities therein. 66

Although it has sometimes been asserted that there is a right to close off areas
of the high seas temporarily, using force to prevent the entry of foreign ships,
the statement in the Handbook, based on the freedom to use the high seas with
due regard for the interests of other high seas users, seems to this writer to
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be as accurate as it is succinct, and to be an admirably clear expression of
the prevailing law.
The passages concerning the Arctic and Antarctic will also appear
unobjectionable to most readers. However, the view that there is a high seas
freedom of navigation and overflight on, over, and under the waters and
icepack of the Arctic would not pass undisputed by all States. 67 As was
mentioned above, Canada, for instance, has claimed certain waters in the
Canadian Arctic archipelago as historic internal waters-a claim which, if
valid, would necessarily oust the high seas freedoms in the areas concerned.
Similarly, the United States position concerning Antarctica is premised upon
its refusal to recognize any of the territorial claims on that continent: such
claims have been made by Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand,
Norway, and the United Kingdom. In practice, however, international
cooperation over the management of Antarctica has been and continues to
be remarkably successful, and there is little danger of any serious international
difficulties arising from the non-recognition of the various claims.
3. Protection of Persons and Property at Sea. From this point onwards in the
Handbook, matters become much less clear. In most cases, where "pure" lawof-the-sea questions become enmeshed with questions concerning the legality
of the use of force to protect persons, property or rights, one is faced with
an array of possible justifications, one shading off into another so
imperceptibly that it is often of little practical value to seek to determine
the limitations of any particular justification. This is particularly true of the
right of self-defense. It must be said at this point that the present paper does
not attempt an exhaustive analysis of this unsettled area of the law. Such a
task demands a paper in itself. With that proviso, an attempt is made in the
following paragraphs to identify the main areas of controversy.
The first such area arises in the context of piracy. The Handbook gives a
plain account of the rules on the repression of piracy, adhering for the most
part to the wording of the relevant provisions of the 1958 High Seas
Convention and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 68 Thus, piracy is
confined to cases of illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation
committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or
aircraft in or over international waters against another ship or aircraft or
persons and property on board. Specifically excluded from this definition are
cases of mutiny and passenger hijacking, which do not constitute piracy
because they do not involve acts committed by one ship or aircraft against
another.69 The definition is a matter of international law. Individual States
may choose to enact municipal legislation describing hijackings as "piracy,"
but such acts would not constitute piracy as a matter of international law
and so would not be subject to the exceptional jurisdictional rules allowing
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any State to seize pirate ships on the high seas.7° This point is considered
further below.
This scrupulous adherence to the terms of international conventions breaks
down in the provisions concerning the pursuit of pirates. The Handbook states
categorically that
Pursuit of a pirate vessel or aircraft through or over international straits overlapped
by territorial waters or through or over archipelagic sea lanes may proceed with or
without the consent of the coastal nation or nations, provided the pursuit is expeditious
and direct and the transit passage rights of others are not unreasonably constrained in
the process.71

This view is probably based on the understanding that the purpose of transit
or archipelagic sea lanes passage is irrelevant to its legality, and that only
the manner of such passage is so relevant. That interpretation may draw support
from the ruling of the International Court of Justice to similar effect in the
context of innocent passage in the Corfu Channel case.72 Nonetheless, it does
not necessarily overcome the objection that pursuit may constitute an
"activity" additional to mere passage which would, under articles 39(1)(c)
and 54 of the 1982 Convention, take the pursuing ship outside the scope of
transit or archipelagic sea lanes passage. The United States view is,
presumably, that pursuit is not another "activity" and that it does not result
in the loss of transit rights. But if that be so, it is not immediately apparent
why the same claim to a right to pursue through straits and archipelagic sea
lanes is not made in the context of hot pursuit. The part of the Handbook dealing
with that topic, however, states that the right of pursuit ceases as soon as
the ship pursued enters its own or a third State's territorial sea. 73 While it
may be thought that no State could wish to object to the pursuit of pirates,
as the common enemies of mankind, some coastal States may yet be jealous
of their sovereignty. If that point is unsettled, it is perfectly plain that the
pirate vessels may not be seized in or over territorial or archipelagic waters.
Such seizure would, if committed without the consent of the coastal State
concerned, undoubtedly violate that State's sovereignty, and it is unfortunate
that the Handbook does not make this clear.
As was noted above, the definition of piracy excludes mutinies and
passenger hijackings. However, as the Handbook notes in a later section,
International law , embodied in the doctrines of self-defense and protection of nationals,
provides authority for the use of proportionate force by u.s. warships and military
aircraft when necessary for the protection of U.S. flag vessels, u.s. citizens (whether
embarked in U.S. or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in
international waters.74

That claim, evident in the United States' action in the Achille Lauro affair,75
puts in issue the current ambit of the right of self-defense and allied rights.
Although the right to use force in peacetime to protect national flag vessels
might be well established, the use of force to protect nationals on foreign
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flag ships is much more controversial.76 The Handbook notes the primary
responsibility of the coastal State in internal, archipelagic and territorial
waters for the protection of all persons and vessels lawfully within its
territory, and cautions against interference with the exercise of jurisdiction
by such coastal States.77 But even in relation to action on the high seas or
in the EEZ, it is at the very least arguable that forcible action to protect
U.S. citizens on foreign flag ships cannot lawfully be taken unless the flag
State concerned has requested or consented to such use of force, or is in
violation ofits duty to take all reasonable steps to secure the safety and release
of the victims, or immediate action is required to protect human life. Indeed,
those criteria are quite properly set out in the Handbook as governing the use
of force to protect foreign flag vessels and foreign persons.78
The Handbook is, understandably, somewhat reticent on the detailed rules
concerning the use of force to protect U.S. interests. It refers to the peacetime
rules of engagement, which are "carefully constructed to ensure that the
protection of U.S. flag vessels and U.S. citizens and their property at sea
conforms with U.S. and international law and reflects national policy. ''79 It
may be that those rules of engagement impose strict limitations on the
circumstances in which such protection is to be forcibly asserted. Without
sight of them, there is little more that can be said by way of a critique of
the position adopted in the Handbook.

4. Safeguarding of u.s. National Interests in the Maritime Environment. The
fourth and final chapter in the part of the Law of Peacetime Naval Operations
sets out the obligations under the United Nations Charter to use peaceful
means to settle international disputes and to refrain from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
with the exception of the right to use force in self-defense preserved by article
51 of the Charter. It also emphasizes the requirements of necessity and
proportionality which attend the use of force in self-defense.
The scope of the right of self-defense is, of course, one of the most debated
issues in contemporary international law, and the comments offered here do
not approach an exhaustive nor even comprehensive survey of the subject.
As the debate continues, the tendency is for official formulations of the
doctrine to retreat into the Delphic wisdom of the Caroline formula, and the
Handbook is no exception to this tendency. Self-defense is dealt with in three
paragraphs. 80 The first sets out the right in general terms, and cites a number
of examples of protective action "premised on the broader principle of selfdefense," among them the Cuban quarantine of 1962; the second lays claim
to a right of anticipatory self defence; and the third, in effect, says that all
the important rules are to be found outside the Handbook, in the peacetime
Rules of Engagement.
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The first of these paragraphs raises the question of the kinds of action
justified under the doctrine of self-defense. The Cuban quarantine focused
attention on the difficulties of using self-defense against threats which are
neither threats of the use of armed force, nor threats of immediate and
unlawful injuries to a State. Indeed, as Abram Chayes recalls in his excellent
study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, even within the United States
administration there were considerable misgivings concerning the
applicability of the doctrine in that context, and attempts were. made to rest
the justification of the action on the supposed "authorization" of the action
by the Organization of American States. 81 These difficulties have been
increased by the decision of the International Court in the Nicaragua case, in
which the majority (in passages open to serious criticism) appeared to hold
that the right of self-defense exists only in the face of an armed attack, and
not acts which do not amount to an armed attack. 82 It is inconceivable that
the Court which delivered the Nicaragua judgment should have held the Cuban
quarantine to be a lawful exercise of the right of self-defense. The Handbook's
assertion that the quarantine "has been widely approved as a legitimate
exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" may
be true. 83 It is also true, but not stated, that the quarantine has been widely
criticized as failing to meet the requirements for the invocation of that
doctrine, and that such criticisms have received powerful support from the
Nicaragua judgment.84
It requires but little prescience to see that, post-Nicaragua, States are likely
to place greater reliance on the right of anticipatory self-defense, consideration
of which was expressly excluded from the International Court's judgment
in that case. 85 Although reputable commentators have questioned the
existence of a right of anticipatory self-defense, their views are bewildering.
One wonders what, exactly, they think defense is. Certainly, the idea that
an attack must be suffered before a right of defense arises makes no sense.
It is not the preceding attack that justifies the use of force, for that would
be an essentially punitive response. The justification lies in the use of force
to ward off a continuation of the attack, or further attacks. In that sense,
the existence of an actual attack can have only an evidential role, putting
beyond doubt the hostile intent of the aggressor. But if that intent can be
otherwise established (as it must be if anticipatory action is to be lawful, since
the right is one of anticipatory self-defense, not preemptive attack), there
seems no earthly reason why the right of self-defense cannot be invoked.
Regrettably, but for obvious reasons, the Handbook does not detail the
circumstances in which hostile intent will be presumed by the United States
Navy. Such matters are dealt with in the Rules of Engagement. There is little
point in speculating on what those rules might be. However, it may be helpful
to offer three general comments.

Lowe

129

First, the Handbook follows the Caroline formula and requires that there be
a "clear necessity that is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no reasonable
choice of means."86 The word "reasonable" is important. It is difficult to
believe that Professor O'Connell was right in suggesting that "in the exercise
of sea power one must expect to sustain an initial casualty before going into
action under the cover of self-defense. "87 Such an attitude towards the
determination of hostile intent cannot in all circumstances be realistic. If, for
instance, the "initial casualty" suffered by the United Kingdom in the
Falklands conflict had been one of its aircraft carriers, it is quite possible that
the British action would have had to be aborted. If losing an initial casualty
means losing the conflict, the right of self-defense can only mean that there
is a right to use force to avert the initial casualty.
Second, the difficulty of establishing proportionality in the context of selfdefense should be noted. To return to the Falklands example, the threat
presented by the General Belgrano itself to the British fleet was limited; the
threat presented by the entire Argentinian Navy was considerable. If sinking
the General Belgrano was arguably a disproportionate response to the threat
which it alone presented, could it not be argued also that the sinking was
an economical and proportionate use of force to avert the threat presented
by the entire Argentinian Navy (which did not, indeed, further threaten the
British task force after the sinking)? Proportionality would be a beautifully
clear test, if only it were clear what has to be counted in establishing the
proportions.
A third, and related, point is that the right of anticipatory self-defense may
exist in circumstances which appear close to reprisals. For example, the attack
by the United States on an Iranian oil platform on October 19, 1987, three
days after the United States merchant ship Sea Isle City had been hit by an
Iranian missile, appears at first sight to be an act of reprisal, since the attack
on the Sea Isle City (and other vessels around the same time) was over and
done with. But here, as in other circumstances where there is a "pinprick"
pattern of repeated attacks, each relatively limited in scope, it is surely
legitimate to take action in order to avert future attacks of the same kind
if (and only if) satisfactory evidence of the likelihood of future attacks can
be adduced. 88
The situation in the Gulf underlines the swiftness with which States can
move from a situation of dealing with isolated violations of their rights to
outright armed conflict. One of the most important passages in this chapter
of the Handbook is the observation that, "[i]n recent years ... the concepts
of both 'war' and 'peace' have become blurred and no longer lend themselves
to clear definition. Consequently, it is not always possible, or even useful,
to try to draw neat distinctions between the two. "89 That observation is
critical to an understanding of the significance of the second part of the
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Handbook, which deals with the Law of Naval Warfare, and to that part
attention will now be turned.

The Law of Naval Warfare
5. Principles and Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict. Nothing which is said
subsequently must be allowed to detract from one crucial point which goes
to the very heart of the defensibility of all of this part of the Handbook. Put
simply, it is by no means clear that the traditional Laws of War retain their
validity today. This point arises clearly in chapter five, which details the
principles and sources of the "Law of Armed Conflict." The statement of
principles, based on the use of minimum force and the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants, is unremarkable. The statement of the
sources from which those principles are distilled raises one of the most
important controversies in contemporary international law.
The customary Law of War is treated with appropriate caution:
It is frequently difficult to determine the precise point in time at which a usage or practice
of warfare evolves into a customary rule of law. In a period marked by rapid
developments in technology, coupled with the broadening of the spectrum of warfare
to encompass insurgencies and state-sponsored terrorism, it is not surprising that nations
often disagree as to the precise content of an accepted practice of warfare and as to
its status as a rule of law. This lack of precision in the definition and interpretation
of rules of customary law has been a principal motivation behind efforts to codify the
law of armed conflict through written agreements (treaties and conventions).90

It is the reference in the last sentence to treaties and conventions which gives
rise to difficulty. The· Handbook proceeds to list the principal international
agreements "reflecting the development and codification of the law of armed
conflict." The list is headed by certain of the Hague Conventions of 1907,91
which exemplify the traditional Laws of War. None of those Hague
Conventions has more than about one-fifth of the States which presently
constitute the world community as parties, and many of the parties have
entered reservations to parts of those Conventions; and although there are
isolated examples of States notifying in recent years the continued
applicability of some of them,92 there must be considerable doubt as to the
extent to which the Conventions represent current law.
These doubts arise from a number of specifically legal considerations (quite
apart from the doubts created by technical developments in weaponry and
from widespread failures to comply with some of the supposed rules, such
as those in the 1936 London Submarine Protocol)93 which are familiar and
can be briefly stated. First, there is the argument that since the outlawing
of the use of force by the United Nations Charter, no state of "war" can
lawfully arise. Accordingly the criterion for the applicability of the Laws
of War cannot be met, the legality of all uses of force henceforth being judged
by reference to the terms of the Charter. The Handbook disposes of this
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argument by stating that "[w]hether or not resort to armed conflict in a
particular circumstance is prohibited by the United Nations Charter (and
therefore unlawful), the manner in which that armed conflict is conducted
continues to be regulated by the law of armed conflict. "94 That proposition
might command widespread assent, but does not wholly resolve the argument.
Some of the provisions of the Hague Conventions, and rather more of the
traditional customary Law of War, cannot easily be reconciled with the
Charter. For example, article 1 of Hague Convention XI concerning the right
of capture in naval war assumes the legality of the blockade of ports. On
the other hand, the United Nations has taken the view that blockade
constitutes an act of aggression, and that no consideration of whatever nature,
whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a
justification for aggression. 95 Blockade could only be justified as an act of
self-defense, but in that case the requirements of necessity and proportionality
inherent in the doctrine of self-defense create substantial problems for the
interdiction of third-State shipping by means ofblockade. 96 Plainly, the Laws
of War must be read in the light of the Charter, and the Charter itself requires
that it prevail in the case of any inconsistency between them. 97 Only uses
of force authorized by the United Nations or kept within the confines of the
right of self-defense are lawful, and the rights and duties of States under the
traditional Laws of War must be regarded as having been modified
accordingly.98
The second consideration is that the Laws of War, as will be seen, conflict
in many particulars with the rules set out in the 1958 and 1982 conventions
on the Law of the Sea. 99 This conflict arises even at the most general level.
Article 88 of the 1982 Convention reserves the high seas (and, by virtue of
article 58, the EEZ) for peaceful purposes. Article 301 of the Convention
requires States using the seas to refrain from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other
manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations. The combined effect is no more, and certainly
no less, than to tie the legality of uses of the seas to compliance with the
constraints on the use of force under the Charter. The natural inference is
that the use of force, whether or not authorized under the Laws of War,
could only be lawful under the 1982 Convention to the extent that it is
justifiable under the Charter-i.e., for practical purposes in this context,
justifiable according to the rules on self-defense, embodied in article 51 of
the Charter.
This in turn raises the question whether the 1982 (or 1958) conventions apply
in case of armed conflict. While none of the 1958 conventions on the Law
of the Sea expressly so provide, it is true that the International Law
Commission, which prepared draft articles on the subject for consideration
by the Geneva Conference, intended the articles to apply in time of peace. lOO
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The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is similarly silent, although here, too,
it was understood that the Conference was concerned with the peacetime
Law of the Sea. If the rules on self-defense are regarded as governing all uses
offorce, no problem arises, since the right of self-defense will (almost) always,
as a matter oflaw, allow the use of force in violation of treaty obligations. lOl
But if the Law of War is regarded as still operative, there arises the
considerable problem of knowing when the peacetime conventional rules are
overridden by the Law of War. This problem might be answered for practical
purposes for the u.S. Navy by the invocation of the wartime rules of
engagement,l02 but this does not dispose of the legal question: might the
wartime rules of engagement, as a matter of international law , be incorrectly
invoked?
That said, it must be admitted that the United States is not alone in referring
to the old Laws of War as still operative. 103
The significance of these issues can be illustrated with a single example.
The traditional Law of War allows neutral coastal States to deny belligerents
passage through the territorial sea. The 1958 and 1982 Conventions give a
right of innocent passage, and even though that right may be suspended
temporarily for security reasons, such suspension may not discriminate in fact
or form between foreign ships.t04 May a coastal State deny passage to
belligerent ships, but not to non-belligerent foreign ships? If so, at what point
does the right to override the provisions of the Law of the Sea conventions
arise, in cases where there is no express declaration of war or recognition
of belligerency? Does it make any difference if either or both (or all) of the
belligerents claim to be using force in self-defense, and does it further modify
the position if the coastal State, or States generally, or the United Nations,
or the International Court, have recognized that such claims of self-defense
are legally valid? Would the coastal State's rights to suspend passage be any
different if it sought to justify its own action under the rules of self-defensewould that permit a discriminatory denial of passage to the belligerents alone?
There are no easy answers to such questions, and no answers at all which
do not depend in large measure upon the position which is adopted concerning
the relationship of the United Nations Charter, the Laws of War, and the
peacetime Law of the Sea.
It is, moreover, apparent that there is no settled international consensus
upon what that relationship might be. The issue is rarely addressed directly,
but divergences in States' views may be inferred from their practice. To take
one further example to contrast with the approach adopted in the Handbook,
in the recent Iran-Iraq conflict, the United Kingdom clearly tied the question
of the legality of the practice of the belligerent States in visiting and searching
neutral flag merchant ships in the Persian/Arabian Gulf to article 51 of the
United Nations Charter:
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[U]nder article 51 of the United Nations Charter a state such as Iran, actively engaged
in an armed conflict, is entitled in exercise of its inherent right of self defence, to stop
and search a foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict. This
is an exceptional right: if the suspicions prove to be unfounded and if the ship has not
committed acts calculated to give rise to suspicion, then the ship's owners have a good
claim for compensation for loss caused by the delay.1°s

The language is permeated by the essence of self-defense: the particular ship
must be suspicious; the suspicion must be one of carrying arms; and, must
be one of carrying them to the other side. The right of action is tightly bound
by the requirements of necessity and the imminence of the threat against
which the State is defending itself.
Contrast that statement with the approach adopted in the Handbook:
Visit and search is the means by which a belligerent warship or belligerent military
aircraft may determine the true character (enemy or neutral) of merchant ships
encountered outside neutral territory, the nature (contraband or exempt "free goods")
of their cargo, the manner (innocent or hostile) of their employment, and other facts
bearing on their relation to the armed ·conflict. 106

The whole approach is quite different, the Handbook not ruling out the
systematic, precautionary visit and search of foreign merchant ships. Indeed,
the two passages illustrate what appears to be a significant difference between
the approaches of the United States and the United Kingdom. Both in the
Falklands conflict in 1982 and in its reactions to the recent Gulf conflict, the
United Kingdom has striven to avoid any recourse to the language of the
traditional Law of War or any other suggestion that those rules are applicable,
and has sought to pin all questions of the legality of armed action to the
doctrine of self-defense under article 51 of the Charter. The Handbook, on
the other hand, freely uses the vocabulary of the Laws of War and appears
to admit a considerable role for the traditional law .107 If NATO has not yet
attempted to resolve such differences, which could crucially affect the
feasibility ofjoint NATO action in contexts such as the Gulf conflict, it should
attach a high priority to doing so.
The remaining comments upon this second part of the Handbook must be
understood against that background. The comments are made, for the most
part, on the assumption that the United States' perception of the role of the
Laws of War is correct, although that position is not one which commends
itself to the present author, who prefers the view that those laws must be
read in light of the constraints on the use of force imposed by the United
Nations Charter.

6. Adherence and Enforcement. Chapter six of the Handbook is concerned with
the responsibility of States and individuals to comply with the Laws of War.
The most notable provisions concern reprisal, defined as "an enforcement
measure under the law of armed conflict consisting of an act which would
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otherwise be unlawful but which is justified as a response to the unlawful
acts of an enemy. "108 The legal status of reprisals involving the use of force
is not wholly settled. The United Nations Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by
the General Assembly in 1970 by consensus, provides that "States have a duty
to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force. "109 This is difficult
to reconcile with the traditional right of belligerents to take reprisals. Perhaps
the most satisfactory justification of armed reprisals is to be gleaned from
a statement in the Handbook itself: "[t]he sole purpose of a reprisal is to induce
the enemy to cease its illegal activity and to comply with the law of armed
conflict. "110 Reprisals are, on this view, emphatically not retaliatory: on the
contrary, they are essentially defensive, being aimed at the prevention of
further actions in violation of the Laws of War against the State taking
reprisals. They may be reconciled with the Charter by regarding them as
an aspect of the doctrine of self-defense,111 and accordingly they must be
confined to the action necessary to avert a real and imminent threat, and
proportionate to the magnitude of the harm threatened. The criteria for valid
reprisals given in the Handbook are consistent with the traditional rules and
with the account given here, with one exception. 1l2 It is said that the reprisal
must be proportional to the original violation. That may be quite different
from the proportion which it would bear to the harm threatened in the future,
against which the proportionality of defensive action should be measured.
For example, the shooting down without warning of a civil aircraft known
to be carrying key enemy politicians might occur in circumstances which
make it plain that only that aircraft and the politicians on it were regarded
as a military target. There might be no threat of repetitions of the action,
and in that case "reprisals" would not be justified under article 51 of the
Charter. In fact, since the Handbook criteria specify that reprisal action must
desist as soon as the enemy is induced to desist from its unlawful activities,
this point is probably covered. Furthermore, the Handbook notes that the
United States has historically been reluctant to resort to reprisal because of
the -risk of triggering retaliatory escalation, and that the National Command
Authorities alone may authorize the taking of reprisal action.ll3 It may
therefore be expected that the obligation to confine action taken by way of
reprisal within the limits of proportionality and necessity will be a paramount
factor in deciding upon the permissibility of any proposed reprisal action.

7. The Law of Neutrality. The most complex questions concerning the Laws
of War at sea arise in the context of what used to be called-and is still called
by the Handbook-the Law of Neutrality. Here there is a direct confrontation
between the demands or expectations of States not involved in the conflict
that they be allowed to enjoy their peacetime rights, and on the other hand

Lowe

135

the demands or expectations of the combatants that they be allowed to engage
in operations necessary for the protection of their security and their other
rights under international law. The position is complicated from the outset
by the fact that, both under the United Nations Charter and under treaties
of collective self-defense, States may be obliged to intervene in a conflict
on behalf of one of the combatant States, and to that extent neutrality is not
an option. 114 However, as experience in the recent conflict between Iran and
Iraq shows clearly, there is still an important role for the institution of
neutrality.
Chapter seven of the Handbook sets out an account of the rights and duties
of neutral States, in what is for the most part a clear and concise restatement
of the traditional rules. Thus, for instance, the "24-hour rule" in Hague
Convention XIII, requiring that belligerent vessels be given a day to leave
neutral ports at the outbreak of armed conflict, and the rule limiting the
number of warships of any belligerent allowed to be in a neutral port
simultaneously (absent special legislation by the neutral State) to three, are
repeated here.115 It was noted above that there are some doubts as to the
continuing validity of these rules, and as to their applicability in a postCharter world. But the remaining comments on this chapter will deal with
broader issues, in which the conflict between the Law of Neutrality and
peacetime rights and duties under the Law of the Sea is most apparent.
The problem of reconciling the traditional neutral right to close territorial
waters to belligerent warships116 with the duty to suspend innocent passage
only on a non-discriminatory basis was remarked upon above, in the comments
on chapter five of the Handbook. Other problems arise in the same context.
One of the most important of these is the uncertain relationship between acts
of passing vessels which deprive them of their innocence, and acts which
violate the neutrality of the coastal State. It is not difficult to imagine
circumstances where the "mere" passage of a belligerent warship steps onto
the borderline between mere passage and the use of neutral waters as a
sanctuary or base of operations, but without prejudicing the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State. This may be true, for instance, in cases where
the duration of passage exceeds 24 hours.ll7 What is the coastal State to do?
It may feel obliged to apply the peacetime rule, relying upon its rights to
suspend innocent passage, to terminate non-innocent passage and to act in
self-defense in order to safeguard its rights and interests. On this basis, it may
feel obliged to permit what it regards as innocent passage. The other
belligerent may regard a more protracted passage as a violation of coastal
neutrality, and assert a right to engage in self-help enforcement actions in
cases where the neutral State cannot or will not enforce its neutrality.11s
In the absence of an authoritative determination of the point at which the
peacetime rules yield to the Laws of War and Neutrality, the dangers of
disputes arising between the "neutral" and "belligerent" States (use of the
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terms begs the question) is only too apparent. 119 If the Laws of War and
Neutrality are to be invoked, there is no obvious solution to this problem.
If, on the other hand, the actions of combatant and neutral States are judged
by reference to the rules of self-defense, the legal significance of the transition
from peace to war is greatly reduced, and the position somewhat more certain.
The coastal State's rights remain as stated above; but the belligerents may
not use self-help in response to every uncorrected breach of neutrality, but
only in response to those breaches which threaten some immediate injury to
themselves.
The assertion of the right to engage in self-help enforcement actions is itself
controversial. l20 Certainly, the judgment of the International Court in the
Corfu Channel Case suggests that forcible self-help is unlawful in international
law. 121 There is, indeed, very little evidence, outside the cases of the use of
force to protect nationals (which are better regarded as instances of the use
of force in self-defense), of the international community accepting the legality
of self-help actions. l22 However, the applicability of the view to cases of the
enforcement of neutral duties might be doubted. Castren, writing in 1954,
took the same view as that taken in the Handbook. He wrote that "If. . . a
neutral State has neither the desire nor the power to interfere and the situation
is serious, other belligerents may resort to self-help. "123 The question only
becomes relevant where combatants violate the neutrality of another State
which in tum is unable or unwilling to prevent such violation, and is therefore
unlikely to arise commonly. But if such extreme cases do arise, it seems
probable that where military considerations demand it, States will not shrink
from taking such action in self-help, no matter how dubious its legality. It
should also be recognized that in some cases justifications for action might
be made on the broad ground of self-defense.
Similar difficulties attend the attempts to justify the traditional rules on
visit and search and blockade. Exercise of visit and search interferes with
the freedom of navigation on the high seas and innocent passage through the
territorial sea. At what stage in a conflict, and in what circumstances, do
the conventional rights of visit (which, under the 1958 and 1982 Conventions,
do not extend to visit and search for the purpose of interdicting supplies to
the enemy) give way to the traditional belligerent right of visit and search?124
As was noted above, the British view appears to be that each individual
instance of visit and search must be justified as an exercise in self-defense,
whereas the Handbook appears to contemplate systematic visit and search.
Pragmatism suggests that the difficulties of determining the nature of cargoes
carried by merchant ships should tend to support a right of systematic visit
and search, but it must be admitted that this is difficult to reconcile with
the normal navigational rights of neutral States under the 1958 and 1982
Conventions (and, of course, under customary law).
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Associated with the question of visit and search is the troubled question
of contraband. It is often observed that because the war effort of a country
is so inextricably rooted in its general economy, the distinction between
materials which contribute to the war effort and those which do not simply
cannot be drawn with anything approaching clarity. There has been a steady
move in this century towards the extension of the category of contraband.
To speak of contraband consisting in goods "susceptible to use in armed
conflict" hardly narrows the field significantly, as those who recall the
collection of domestic saucepans and park railings for use by the armaments
industry in World War II will attest. l25 And if the list of goods the export
of which has been embargoed on security grounds under the United States
Export Administration Act is anything to go by, the list of contraband goods
will be a long one. l26 The Handbook specifies medicines, clothing, shelter and
food, etc., for the civilian population and sick and wounded combatants as
exempt from capture as contraband, provided there is not serious reason to
suppose that such goods will be diverted for military purposes or will release
other goods for military use and give the enemy a definite military
advantage. l27 This might compromise the notion of contraband in abstract,
since all such goods can contribute to the war effort. But the humanitarian
considerations are rightly to the fore in these cases, and these are more likely
to be secured by clear statements of the goods exempt from capture than
by attempting to formulate a coherent and comprehensive definition of
contraband.
Consideration of contraband leads naturally to a consideration of blockade.
Here again, the foremost question is whether the legality of blockade must
be referred to article 51 of the United Nations Charter, or whether there
is a more general right for combatants to use this tactic. If article 51 is the
crucial provision then the blockade must be mounted against an imminent
threat-and under the rules set out in the Nicaragua case, an imminent threat
of an armed attack. Precautionary blockades of the kind used in the Cuban
Missile Crisis are not lawful. Reference of the question to the Laws of War
raises the general issue of the persistence of those rules and of the manner
in which the expectation of the continued enjoyment of freedom of navigation
and innocent passage under the 1958 and 1982 Conventions is to be
accommodated, and the determination of the point, if any, at which those
conventions are overridden by the Laws of War. That question has taken on
an added significance in the light of the International Court's ruling in the
Nicaragua case that the mining of Nicaraguan ports by the United States
infringed third States' freedom of communication and maritime commerce.t28
That said, the account of blockade given in the Handbook I29 is, in terms of
the traditional Laws of War, unexceptionable. There are some debatable
points, such as the old chestnuts as to whether a blockade can lawfully be
mounted by mining alone,13o and whether the prohibition in Hague
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Convention VIII on the use of naval mines "with the sole purpose of
intercepting commercial shipping" in effect prohibits the use of mines for
blockade. But such questions seem devoid of substance today.131 There can
be little doubt that mines will be used for the purposes for which they are
designed, which include the interdiction of shipping bound for enemy ports,
and that such uses are unlikely to be challenged on the basis of an alleged
incompatibility with the Laws of War-although challenges might be based
on interference with the freedom of navigation established in the (peacetime)
Law of the Sea. 132
.
The final matter for discussion in this chapter is the section on belligerent
control of the immediate area of naval operations. 133 Put briefly, the Handbook
asserts a right to establish zones around naval operations from which neutral
ships may be excluded, so long as such ships are not thereby denied access
to international straits or to neutral nations, and within which neutral ships
are subject to control by the belligerent naval commander; neutral ships not
complying with orders in the zone, or engaging in activities benefitting the
enemy (such as the carriage of contraband, or communicating military
information) are liable to capture or destruction. Such zones were established
by both sides in the Second World War, but it must be noted that they are
different in nature and justification from exclusion zones of the kind
established by the United Kingdom during the Falklands conflict. The latter
did not purport to exclude neutral shipping; rather, ships therein were
regarded as operating in support of the Argentinian occupation of the islands,
and therefore hostile and liable to attack, unless the ships had obtained the
consent of the British Government to transit the zone. l34 The zones were
conceived as a means of dealing with the problem of determining the "hostile
intent" of foreign ships which would justify the British Navy in using force
in self-defense: mere presence in the zone constituted prima facie evidence of
hostile intent. The legality of any action against Argentinian or other ships
would by this view still have to be judged under article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. War zones, on the other hand, claim to draw their validity
from the Laws of War, and to the extent that action is taken in them which
goes beyond the limits of lawful self-defense under article 51, their legality
must be regarded as being at best highly controversial. The crucial provisions
are likely to be found in the Rules of Engagement which supplement the
account given in the Handbook.
8. The Law of Naval Targeting
9. Conventional Weapons and Weapons Systems
10. Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons
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11. Noncombatant Persons
12. Deception During Armed Conflict

The remaining chapters of the Handbook raise few issues relating specifically
to the Law of the Sea, and will be dealt with briefly. Chapter eight includes
a valiant attempt to salvage some sane and humanitarian rules from the 1936
London Protocol after the savagery of submarine warfare during World War
II. However, the obligation to place the crew of a merchant ship in a place
of safety before destroying it is one which favors States with large navies
at their disposal, and despite all the honorable intentions of the drafters of
the Handbook, one is left with the suspicion that this is likely to be one of
the first provisions to disappear in the downward spiral of violation and
reprisals which has characterized all the major wars this century.
Furthermore, the exceptions which the Handbook admits, allowing attack
without warning of, inter alia, armed merchant ships,135 are likely to increase
the danger to merchantmen. The arming of merchant ships may well be seen
as a necessary and prudent step at an early stage in a conflict, especially if
(as is the case in the recent Gulf conflict) merchantmen have been subjected
to surprise attacks by light surface vessels.
Chapter nine contains some interesting remarks on naval mines. Modern
influence mines do not, of course, come within the literal wording of Hague
Convention VIII, but the Handbook applies the principles enshrined in the
Convention to them by analogy. The view that controlled mines may be freely
laid during peacetime in a State's internal, archipelagic or territorial waters,
or on the high seas or EEZ (provided that they do not unreasonably interfere
with other uses of the high seas or EEZ) without notification, because they
do not constitute a hazard to navigation, is noteworthy.1 36
As far as international waters are concerned, this view is controversial.
It might be argued that the sowing of controlled mines constitutes a threat
of force, to be justified under article 51 of the Charter. Certainly, it is difficult
to see the mining of international waters as anything other than a preparation
for the threat or use of force, and such preparation may itself be regarded
as an unlawful threat of force under article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
although there may be some difficulty in identifying the State against which
the supposed threat is made. Such mining may also conflict with the peacetime
Law of the Sea. The sowing of controlled mines in the EEZ of another State
in peacetime gives rise to the argument rehearsed above concerning the extent
of third-State rights in the EEZ; and if mining is regarded as an "unattributed"
right under the 1982 Convention, the legality of which falls for decision under
article 59, it is unlikely that a claim to a right to lay controlled mines could
be supported except in cases where self-defense provides a justification. The
laying of controlled mines on the high seas, with the proviso stated in the
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Handbook, may also conflict with the Law of the Sea. If the argument
concerning the breach of article 2(4) of the Charter sketched out above is
~ccepted, such mining would violate article 301 of the 1982 Convention, which
requires States using the seas to comply with obligations expressed in wording
which follows the terms of article 2(4). Technically, this could be important.
It might be argued that breach of article 301 allows other States to suspend
the operation of the Convention in relation to the defaulting State.137
However, even if this argument were to be accepted, it is unlikely to give
States rights against the defaulting State which they would not otherwise
enjoy under the doctrine of self-defense, the right to prevent non-innocent
passage, and so on. l38
These objections have little force in relation to the mining of a State's own
waters, since laying controlled mines may be seen as a defensive measure
which the State is entitled to take. Any such mines must not in fact constitute
a hazard. If there is any real risk of injury to shipping from a controlled mine,
once the mine is armed, notification would be necessary. Mines could,
moreover, only be sown in a manner which did not have the practical effect
of denying to foreign ships such rights of passage as they might have in the
waters in question.
Sowing armed mines is a different matter. Coastal States are certainly
entitled to mine their own waters, subject to the duty to notify their location
and not to hamper the exercise of the right of innocent passage except
temporarily and in limited areas for security reasons. Mining international
waters is a different matter. The International Court in the Nicaragua case
characterized the mining of Nicaraguan ports as an infringement of the
freedom of communications and of maritime commerce, and condemned the
failure to notify the existence of the mine fields as a breach of the principles
of humanitarian law.139 It did not decide that the use of mines in peacetime
as a measure of self-defense is per se unlawful. The statement in the Handbook
that international waters may be mined before the outbreak of armed conflict
only under the most demanding requirements of individual or collective selfdefense, and subject to prior notification of the location and the anticipated
date of removal, appears justifiable. Indeed, the tone of the passage in the
Handbook is markedly more restrained than an earlier State Department paper
on the subject. 14o If the threat or use of force implicit in the mining is justified
on the grounds of self-defense, prior notification is given, and the areas mined
are not so extensive or so important to third-State navigation as to amount
to an unreasonable restraint on the freedom of navigation, then the mining
of international waters should be regarded as a lawful use of the high seas.
The account of the legal limitations on mining in wartime, which follows
closely the terms of Hague Convention VIII, is not controversial. 141 It will
be noted that the Handbook regards the emplacement of nuclear mines on the
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seabed beyond the territorial sea as prohibited by the Seabed Arms Control
Treaty.142
By the time the lawyer gets to chapter ten, which deals with weapons with
an unusual potential for causing indiscriminate and unnecessary suffering, he
or she is likely to feel that the time for legal debate is fast drawing to an
end. Experience of the wars since 1945 offers little encouragement to those
who try to preserve in war at least the basic moral and humanitarian values,
in whose name so many wars are fought. The prohibitions on the first use
of lethal chemicals, and the use of biological weapons, are soberly recited,
as is the prohibition on the targeting of civilian populations with nuclear
weapons. The latter, in particular, will warm the hearts of those who find
the targeting of enemy cities with long-range nuclear missiles morally
repugnant and legally indefensible. The legality of the use of nuclear weapons
against enemy combatants is, however, affirmed. Apart from expressing the
fervent hope that these provisions remain of academic interest, and that some
thought has been given as to ways of preserving in practice the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants in nuclear exchanges, there is little
that the lawyer can add.

Concluding Remarks
This paper has concentrated on the Law of the Sea in peacetime, because
that is still the law most commonly relevant. Before closing, the central point
made in relation to the section of the Handbook on the Law of War should
once more be emphasized. The very idea that the Laws of War, in particular
the eighty-year old Hague Conventions, remain binding is one which is open
to serious doubt. The principles which underlie those laws and conventions
no doubt remain valid, but there is much to be said for the view that there
should be but one section in this Handbook, on the Law of the Sea, and that
all questions concerning the use of armed force should be referred to the rules
on the use of force and self-defense embodied in the United Nations Charter.
The choice between these two approaches appears to be open, and the law
unclear. The final decision in practice, which will in turn yield the
authoritative answer in law as to which of the two is correct, lies in the hands
of those in the United States and elsewhere who write and implement
handbooks such as that reviewed here. Their practice will constitute the new
customary law. As a matter of policy there is much to be said for the certainty
and predictability which the detail of the Laws of War inject into armed
conflict, minimizing the risk of unwantecl escalations of the use of force. But
there are problems in reconciling them with the Charter and with the
peacetime Law of the Sea, and those problems must be attended to. Peace
is fragile enough without the opening up of a body oflaw outside the Charter
to which States may appeal when the constraints of article 51 do not suit
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them. The Handbook is an excellent starting point for the task of revising the
Laws of War to bring them in line with contemporary law and contemporary
warfare. That task is an urgent one.
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